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ABSTRACT
Strategies of coping with information overload were studied in an
experimentally-induced overload situation. Forty undergraduate male
volunteer subjects participated, and the responses they generated to
cope with overload were broken down into five categories. The influ-
ences of perceived control and generalized expectancy for success on
the development of these strategies were investigated. The results sug-
gest that the efforts at control manifested in this experiment reflected
subjects' generalized expectancies of control and mastery. A possible
relation between reactions to experimental overload and the breakdown
of the "filter" in schizophrenia is discussed.
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I
INTRODUCTI ON
The experience of being "swamped" with information is one which
touches many aspects of daily life. Schedules and appointment note-
books are but one evidence of the demands competing for one's time and
the need to adjust one's pattern of living to meet these demands. In
the business world as well, executive decisions require an ability to
keep up with ever-increasing amounts of information (French & Caplan,
1972). Urban life is similarly characterized by encounters with sen-
sory and information overload (Milgram, 1970). This tendency is espe-
cially evident in technologically-advanced societies (Lipowski, 1975)
and has been suggested to be a portent of the fate that awaits the mod-
ern person as s/he develops the syndrome popularly labeled "future
shock" (Toffler, 1970).
The purpose of this study is to illustrate how individuals cope
with an exper imental ly- induced overload situation and to determine if
certain cognitive expectancies influence the response generated in that
situation. it will be suggested that the process of strategy selection
in response to overload is determined by the individual's sense that the
incoming information can be controlled through one's expended efforts.
The study of the adaptations that must be made when confronted with
such reality considerations arises out of a view of the individual as an
information-processing organism. It is suggested (Miller, 19&1) that
each individual is capable of processing a limited number of informa-
tional units per given time. So long as a correspondence is maintained
i ng
between input and output, the demands made on the information-process
mechanisms may be met. "Overload" sets in when the channel capacity is
exceeded by the level of stimulus input: i.e., there is more informa-
tion coming in than can presently be processed. This may occur for a
variety of reasons: level of input may be too high; there may be defi-
cits in the individual's ability to process certain amounts or types of
information; or relevant output may be unavailable to the individual.
Whatever the specific dynamics, the result is that the input-output re-
lationship cannot be maintained. In simplest terms, more information
is coming in than the individual can deal with.
Before getting, into the dynamics of overload, some discussion
should be made concerning the strategies which an individual employs to
keep up with information under normal conditions. Referring to the
fractionation ("twigging") of knowledge and interest in technical
fields, Weick (1970) discusses the process by which an individual bal-
ances the need for information with the capacity to absorb it. Weick
suggests that the actor or scientist must continually make decisions
as to the relevance of specific units of information within one's own
scheme. One way this is done is by continual re-definition of the en-
vironment as to what information (qualitatively) and how much informa-
tion (quantitatively) is necessary. The management of information in-
put, then, depends on maintaining a flexible approach in order to keep
pace with the constantly changing objects of inquiry.
The individual is seen as an actor who decides what to do with en-
vironmental input. Processing, then, is an active experience which de-
pends on judgments the individual makes. Zajonc ( 1 96O ) suggests that
the very types of cognitive structures the individual activates when re-
ceiving information depends on what one plans to do with it. Input-
output correspondence is not engaged in a passive, automatic manner, hut
is an outgrowth of what plans the individual has made for the input.
What the actor's task comes down to may be seen as maintaining in-
tegrity in a world of flux. The actor (or Weick's scientist) is not try-
ing to keep up with a stable entity as much as trying to remain as flex-
ible as the world "out there" is while still pursuing a coherent line of
inquiry or action. Because the world is so changing, a degree of ambi-
guity is very often unavoidable in the decisions made about informa-
tional input.
So long as that input is at tolerable levels (i.e., below one's
channel capacity), the individual can continue making new decisions
while still keeping track of old ones (Levinger & Spangenberg, 1976) and
can modify the approach taken if changing requirements demand such an
adaptation. Different strategies must be used, however, when informa-
tion input increases beyond the organism's present capacity to process
it. Decisions must be made as to the immediacy of certain kinds of in-
formation: what must be. responded to at once and what can be held in
abeyance. Strategies for coping with such overload reflect the subse-
quent costs that the organism is willing to assume in order to be able
to restore maximally the current input-output correspondence. A break-
down in functioning may occur when this correspondence remains beyond
the organism's capacity. It has been suggested (McReynolds, i960) that
schizophrenia is an example of such a breakdown, occurring in response
to and as a result of the inability to restore the input-output corre-
s pondence
.
Overload and Schizophren ia
Schizophrenia may be seen as a deficiency in the individual's abil-
ity to "filter" (Broadbent, 1971) incoming information, resulting in an
ever-increasing magnitude of external stimulation. Epstein and Coleman
(1970), in a review of a number of arousal theories of schizophrenia,
suggest that a common assumption of these theories is "that a basic de-
ficit in schizophrenia consists of a low threshhold for disorganization
under increasing stimulus input" (p. 1 36) . The anxiety associated with
schizophrenia may be a function of the level of unass imi lated informa-
tion the individual is carrying around (McReynolds, I960). The ability
to "make sense" of information by categorizing, assimilating, or reject-
ing it is lost, and in its stead there develops a susceptibility to all
environmental input. Thus, reports of schizophrenic experiences refer
to a heightened sensitivity to objects and stimulation (MacDonald, 1964,
p. 181). One way to reduce this experience of bombardment is to with-
draw completely from the world, thereby removing oneself from the realm
of stimulation. It has in fact been shown that, following sensory de-
privation, schizophrenic patients exhibited improved ego functioning and
more adequate reality contact (Cooper, Adams, & Gibby, 1962). Petrie
(1967) suggests a process of "defensive reduction" in schizophrenia to
decrease the amount being perceived. The finding that reduced levels of
stimulation lead to a reduction in schizophrenia-like behaviors may of-
fer potential verification of the role of excessive levels of environ-
mental input in the schizophrenic breakdown.
Some questions arise concerning the cause-effect relationship be-
tween overload and schizophrenia which, though they are beyond the
scope of this study, have led to some interesting studies and findings.
Is schizophrenia the result of a deficiency in one's filtering capacity
or the cause of it? To what degree must the filter be weakened before
the schizophrenic break occurs? Is treatment of schizophrenic symptoms
simply a matter of supervised withdrawal from the world and gradual re-
acclimatization to it? To a large extent, exploration of these ques-
tions has been undertaken by studying the reactions of normal subjects
in schizophrenia-analogous situations.
Usdansky and Chapman (i960), using a conceptual sorting task,
found that time-pressured normals showed impaired performance due to an
increase in associative errors-a type of error found in schizophrenic
thought and performance (Chapman, 1958). Time pressure is thus seen as
a form of over-stimulation and stress, and, under such conditions,
schizophrenia-1 ike performance can be induced in normals. Using a mo-
dification of the Usdansky and Chapman paradigm, Grimes and McGhie
(1973) found that the performance of normals under conditions of dis-
traction stress was similar to that of schizophrenics under non-distrac-
tion conditions. Presumably, the overloading of the normal subjects
with information led to the performance deficit characteristics of schi-
zophrenic subjects and resulted from the necessity to process more in-
formation than could be handled. Most strikingly, Gottschalk, Haer, and
Bates (1972) found a significant increase in sch i zophren i a- 1 i ke activity
and thought (social alienation, personality disorganization, and cogni-
tive impairment) in normals who spent ^3 minutes being bombarded by a
high-intensity
"psychede, ic" soand color movie. Uncontrolled sensory
and informational stimulation, then, may overload the organism's pro-
oessing capacity and be a factor in some forms of psychopathology.
Strategies of Coping wi th Overload
Miller (I960, 1961) suggests various responses by which the indi-
vidual attempts to adjust to information overload. He has identified
seven responses: omission (temporary nonprocess i ng of information);
error tolerance (processing incorrect information); queuing (delaying
response to catch up during a lull); filtering (neglecting to process
certain categories of information while processing others); approxima-
tion (responding with reduced precision); multiple channels (processing
information through two or more parallel channels at the same time);
and escape (terminating the flow of information) (Miller, i960).
Miller's analysis has several shortcomings. There is no notion of
any kind of sequence or flexibility of strategies; rather, they appear
discrete and unconnected. This may relate to his view of overload as
a definite point that is reached (Miller, 1961) rather than as a process
within which the individual sifts information and makes decisions so as
to reduce input to more manageable levels (Weick, 1970). The inference
from Miller is that a single strategy is selected and adhered to, ra-
ther than several being used in conjunction. Seen in this context, "er-
ror" and "approximation" lose some of their distinctiveness, for both
mechanisms entail giving an inexact response without "sharpening" it
subsequently. Similarly, "omitting" and "filtering" both refer to not
processing certain information with no mention made by Miller of how,
for example, "queuing" couId be used „ faci|Uate „ fi , tering „
ler's strategies, as he presents them, appear to be too removed from
real-world applicability to be useful in understanding overload. View-
ing them in the context of Wei ck s £rocess of overl oad br i ngs them into
more of an immediate realm.
As defined in the present study, mechanisms of dealing with over-
load by reducing the amount of incoming information may be grouped into
three broad categories, which differ according to how information is
dealt with. These categories do not take into account a situation
where overload can be prevented by increasing the rate of processing,
for then the individual is never in an overload situation. Rather,
they represent the kinds of decisions the individual can make when
overloaded with information in order to reduce input while maximizing
performance. It should be noted that the category headings which fol-
low are adapted from Miller, but have been made more specific with a
view to operational izing these mechanisms; e.g., Miller's "filtering 11
is operational ized by combining it with a "queuing" mechanism which al-
lows for the retrieval of deferred information. Thus, though the terms
"filtering," "omitting," and "escape" have been used by Miller, they
have been re-defined to fit into a process of reducing information
overload
;
a ) f i 1 terlng : systematic omission of certain categories of in-
formation according to a coherent scheme (this strategy is
systematic in the sense that the information whose processing
has been deferred can be retrieved);
b) omi tt i n g : non-systematic omi ss ion--s impl y not processing cer-
8tain information (which cannot be retrieved);
c) escape
: terminating the s i t ua t ion-- th i s can be either out-
right (by leaving the situation) or indirect (by remaining
in the situation but responding haphazardly).
These definitions differ from Miller's in that, as defined here, a
clear distinction exists between "filtering 11 and "omitting." The dif-
ference revolves around whether the process allows for the retrieval of
information whose processing has been deferred. Because "filtering"--
as conceived here— is systematic in that sense, the individual may make
more efficient use of lull periods to catch up on the material that had
been previously filtered out, for s/he can be precise as to what needs
to be done. Implicit in this definition is the notion that a strategy
is more efficient to the extent that it deals first with information
that cannot be queued (e.g., a task whose presentation will not be re-
peated) rj
The process of dealing with increasing levels of environmental in-
put by attempting to adapt to the rate of input should follow this
route: an individual will initially try to process all the information
coming in. With the realization that one is lagging behind in one's
ability to respond, the individual will begin filtering information,
responding immediately to those bits that will not be repeated and
queuing others to be dealt with later. The most effective strategy, as
overload increases, would be simply to make the filter "tighter" by
queuing more and* more information, while always responding first to that
information which cannot be queued. A less effective strategy would be
to move from filtering to omitting information non-systemat i cal ly . The
decrease In effectiveness will manifest itself by the individual's in-
ability to make up that information which has been "missed." An even
less effective strategy (whether selected from the start or arrived at
via this process) is when one's tolerance for error becomes so great
that responses are simply made haphaza rd
1
y--e i ther in a "h i t-or-mi ss"
attempt to keep up with input, or to subvert the demands being made of
him/her. This, in turn, may be a higher level strategy than direct es-
cape (by leaving the situation), although in the present study the rea-
son for escape will be explored in a post-experimental interview (i.e.,
escape decided upon from a position of power is a different process from
escape due to helplessness).
f~Briefly, then, the continuous "tightening" of the filtering mech-
anism suggests that, under conditions of increasing environmental input,
filtering will precede omitting, which precedes (or accompanies) error
tolerance, which precedes escape/j As overload increases, the individual
moves from a more effective (in terms of dealing with all the input) to
a less effective strategy of response. (it should be noted that while
escape might be effective in terms of protecting self-esteem, it does
not fulfill the experimental requirements of the present study. Rather,
it is a response arrived at when the needs of the subject achieve prece-
dence over the demands of the experimenter. Therefore, though escape
might be the most adaptive response under certain conditions, it repre-
sents a decision that one's need for self-preservation outweighs the
benefits that might accrue from acceding to external demands.)
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Perceived Control and Overload
While a variety of individual differences may reflect an ability
to cope with overload, a number of studies suggest that perceived con-
trol over information input may be the most significant factor. Petrie
(1967) identified a cognitive style which she called "reducing"; a ten-
dency to decrease and limit the amount of stimulation coming in. Sales
(1971) found that "reducers" prefer novel and complex situations, pos-
sibly because the higher level of stimulation such situations offer al-
lows them to undertake their preferred perceptual operation. Thus, in-
dividuals who are identified as "reducers" actually seek out increased
level s of stimulation order to be able to decrease those levels
,
which suggests a desire to exercise some sort of power to achieve con-
trol over the environment. In a similar vein, Glass, Snyder, and Hollis
(197*0 see time urgency (type-A behavior) as a coping style aimed at
maintaining control and achieving power over potentially uncontrollable
env i ronmenta 1 events
.
Petti grew (1975), in a study of organizational consultants, also
mentions the control of information as a power resource. Especially
under conditions of uncertainty, an individual who collects, filters,
and reformulates information is in a good position to facilitate organ-
i za t iona 1 change.
That control of incoming information may be seen as a source of
power suggests that overload may be attractive to some individuals for
the opportunity it provides for the exercise of that power, Weick
(1976) maintains that "overload is a sign that you're indispensable.
Visible overload begets the perception of being powerful, central, a
11
step in every process." The individual who is overloaded is afforded
continual opportunities to exercise power and, in turn, is attributed
power for that exercise. Overload, then, can have both constructive and
destruct i ve effects
.
French and Caplan (1972) distinguish between quantitative and
qual itative overload, suggesting d i f ferent i ab 1 e effects of amount and
kjnd_ of information coming in. Their studies suggest that, while ap-
pearing busy or swamped is desirable, appearing incapable or "out of
one's league" is not. Thus, college professors and white collar work-
ers admit more to quantitative overload than to qualitative overload.
Among college professors, achievement orientation correlated .kl with
number of hours worked per week and .25 with quantitative overload:
these individuals want to be swapped. Qualitative overload, on the
other hand, was found to be related to low self-esteem. There is, then,
a certain amount of prestige associated with appearing to be harried
while actually maintaining control over the environment. To the extent
that the individual can exert this control over environmental input,
s/he should be able to withstand the detrimental effects of overload and
possibly use the situation to increase his/her own self-esteem and/or
social standi ng.
1 nternal ve rsus externa 1 control of re i nforcement . There may be
at least three types of control associated with high levels of environ-
menta 1 input
:
1. ! am personally in control of the amount of information coming
i n
.
2. I am not personally in control of all the information coming
12
in, but there are no negative consequences: either someone
else will assume part of the load, or I will assume it at some
definite future point (i.e., filtering with queuing).
3. I am not in control of the information, and there are negative
consequences, because what I miss cannot be made up.
Beliefs about one's ability to control the environment or to be at
its mercy relate to the ways in which an individual copes with environ-
mental threat (Lazarus, 1966, p. 133). Rotter's (1966) i nterna 1
-exter-
nal (IE) construct differentiates between these perceptions of control
by referring to the generalized belief about the connection between
one's behavior and the reinforcements which follow it (Appendix C)
. As
defined by Rotter (1966), internal control relates to the belief that
environmental events (rewards and punishments) are contingent upon one's
skills, attributes, or behaviors. External control refers to the belief
that those events are beyond personal control, but are, rather, a factor
of luck, chance, or a powerful other. The applications of the IE con-
struct appear in a number of very thorough reviews (Lefcourt, 1966, 1972,
1976; Phares, 1976; Strickland, 1973, 1977). Some of the differences
between internals and externals that appear in the literature will be
mentioned here in terms of their relation to this study.
One of the ways in which internals aim to control their environ-
ment (Julian, L i chtman , S Ryckman , 1 968 ) is by seeking out and utilizing
information relevant to their situation (Seeman, 1963; Seeman & Evans,
1962). Internals characteristically engage the environment via greater
attent i veness (Lefcourt & Wine, 1 969) and 1 onge r deliberation in deci-
sion-making (Rotter & Mulry, 1965) in order to utilize that information
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to cope better with the demands of reality (Phares, 1968). Internals,
then, may be expected to act on their own behalfs to take steps that
will facilitate their adaptation to situational demands.
In fact, both Seernan (1959) and Minton (1967) relate locus of con-
trol to an individual's feeling of personal power. It is suggested that
internal ity is related to perceived power and externality to helpless-
ness. The relationship between externality and psychopathol ogy is well-
documented (Cromwell, Rosenthal, Shakow, & Zahn, 1961; Shybut, 1 968
;
Palmer, 1971; Smith, Pryer, & Distefano, 1971; Lottman & Dewolfe, 1972;
Cash & Stack, 1973; Duke & Mullens, 1973; Levenson, 1973; Lefcourt,
1976; Strickland, 1977) and suggests that, in this study, perceived
lack of control over situational demands could induce a schizophrenia-
like shutting-down process (i.e., escape from the overload situation).
This study will attempt to show how perceived control relates to
strategy-selection under conditions of information overload. As noted
above, overload management can be achieved by exerting control over the
incoming information by making decisions about the categories of input.
It would be most in keeping with situational requirements to respond
first to that information that cannot be made up and to delay response
to information that can be queued. Such a strategy would allow the in-
dividual to satisfy situational requirements without forfeiting over-all
performance or self-esteem. This strategy, though, requires a percep-
tion of control over environmental input (i.e., i nterna 1 i ty) . One who
lacks such a perception, it is suggested, will be unable to establish
control and would therefore be at the mercy of environmental stimula-
tion (i.e., externality) were self-protective steps not taken. These
Ill
steps suggest the development of a strategy in which situational re-
quirements' are replaced with ones arising out of a need to restore self-
esteem or self-integrity. Thus, the individual either responds haphaz-
ardly, irretrievably ignores certain aspects of the situation, or ter-
minates the situation completely. In any case, the strategy selected is
ineffective because there appears to be no way to re-establish control
over the si tuat ion.
The first hypothesis, then, is as follows:
li Internals will attempt to exert control over information (by
responding to both slides and cards simultaneously or by fil-
tering) significantly longer than will externals.
According to Rotter's social learning theory (Rotter, 195*0, behav-
ior potential is a function of an individual's expectancy of reinforce-
ment (based on past reinforcement history) and the value assigned to
that reinforcement. The second and third hypotheses relate to these
two aspects of Rotter's theory as they may be illustrated in the pres-
ent study.
Because the present experimental task requires the individual to
keep up with increasing amounts of input, the experiment may tap some
sort of competency strivings. Presumably, individuals who feel them-
selves to be more competent, based on their past history, should mani-
fest that expectancy in this situation by attempts to keep abreast of
the increasing input. Generally, studies (Feather, 1 966 ; Feather 6
Saville, 1967) have relied on experimental manipulations of success or
competence to investigate the effects of prior success on subsequent ex-
pectations of success. These studies have shown that expectancies for
15
success tend to increase after success and to decrease following fail-
ure. To measure an individual generalized expectancy for success,
Hale and Fibel (1976) constructed the Generalized Expectancy for Success
Scale (Appendix D) which allows for the study of the effects of the suc-
cess expectancies one brings to the experimental situation prior to any
experimental manipulations. This scale was administered to all experi-
mental participants in order to see whether an individual's generalized
expectancy for success would be manifested in attempts to mastering
this specific experimental situation. This reflects the second hypothe-
sis:
2. Individuals with a high generalized expectancy for success
will attempt to exert control significantly longer than indi-
viduals with a low generalized expectancy for success.
The appearance of goa 1 -d i rected behavior within Rotter's theory is
influenced by the preference the individual assigns to that particular
goal or reinforcement: the greater the value assigned to the rein-
forcement, the higher the probability of behavior aimed at attaining
that reinforcement (given that expectancy of reinforcement is constant).
In the present study, the reinforcement value of the experimental task
for each individual should affect the time s/he spends in behavior aimed
at achieving the reinforcement resulting from mastery of the task. This
leads to the third hypothesis:
3. The reinforcement value assigned to the task will correlate
positively with the amount of time spent in control of the in-
put .
16
CHAPTER ||
METHOD
Task
The method followed a two-task paradigm: a primary task consisting
of single slide presentations which were not repeated and a secondary
task to which the subject responded as time permitted. The primary task
required the subject to respond to paragraphs projected on a screen, one
at a time, by noting the number of numerals interspersed within each
paragraph. Only the numerals 2-9 were used, to avoid confusion between
the letter 1 and the number 1 and between the letter 0 and the number 0.
The placement of the numerals within the paragraphs was randomized fol-
lowing the table of random numbers in Myers (1975). The paragraphs were
adapted from the World Book Encyclopedia (1977) and were approximately
50-60 words in length.
The secondary task consisted of a type of discrimination similar to
that of the primary task, but these paragraphs were presented on index
cards which could be stacked if there was not enough time to respond to
them between the successive slide presentations. As the experiment pro-
gressed, the rate of presentation was speeded up (i.e., inter-slide in-
terval was reduced—see Appendix A) so that the primary task came to
"demand" almost all of the subject's attention. Instructions stressed
that the slides were the primary task and that, while both tasks de-
manded response , the secondary task should be responded to as time per-
mitted. To further ensure the primary of the slides, they were defined
as "worth more" than the cards in the final score.
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The subject was required to decide whether to stack the cards as
they were presented in order to respond to them when the slides were
concluded (filtering) or to discard the cards completely (omitting).
The subject could also elect to discontinue the secondary task by shut-
ting off the card machine. Further, the subject could terminate the
experiment at any time.
While internal ity has been shown to be related to academic achieve-
ment (Crandall, Katovsky, & Crandall, 1965; McGhee & Crandall
,
1968;
Nowicki & Strickland, 1973) and could, therefore, have affected the sub-
ject's ability to read the material presented to him in the experimental
task, it is suggested that the task described here required a scanning
rather than a reading approach on the part of the subject. The demand
on the subject was not to comprehend or even to read the material, but
simply to pick out and note the digits scattered throughout the materi-
al. Different reading abilities, then, should not have affected the
subject's ability to carry out the task demands. Hence, strategy selec-
tion directly reflected the subject's perceptions of control. A more
conservative approach could follow Yeats' (1976) suggestion that, when
intelligence is controlled, IE does not strongly predict proofreading
performance. Toward this end, subjects' grade point averages and Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test scores were collected in order to be able to bring
this factor under experimental control.
Subj ects
Forty male volunteers were randomly selected from a pool of Univer-
sity of Massachusetts undergraduates who had volunteered when recruited
18
in their psychology courses. Only males were selected because of the
greater availability of IE data for males. The subjects ranged in age
from 18-33 and received one experimental credit for their participa-
tion. Each subject was tested individually.
Procedure
When the subject entered the laboratory, he was greeted by a ca-
sually-dressed male Caucasian clinical psychology graduate student in
his mid-twenties. The subject was seated at a table seven feet in
front of a movie screen. On the table were two pencils and a blank
sheet of paper on which he was to note his slide responses. To his
right were two timers attached to the card machine, a slide projector,
and a sheet of paper containing spaces in which to note the card re-
sponses. Each card was numbered, so that each response could be enter-
ed in the appropriately numbered space. The sheet on which the slide
responses were to be made was not numbered; rather, the subject re-
ceived immediate verbal feedback as to the accuracy of his slide re-
sponses, in addition to writing down the responses.
Each subject signed an informed consent form (Appendix B) which
also asked for his student number, age, grade point average, and Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test verbal, quantitative, and total scores. He then
filled out two questionnaires: Rotter's Social Reaction Inventory (Ap-
pendix C) and the Hale-Fibel Generalized Expectancy for Success Scale
(Appendix D) . The order of presentation of these questionnaires was
counterbalanced for each subject. After the scales were completed, the
subject read the fol lowing instruct ions
:
19
This is a study of information processing: what people do with
information. You see before you a screen and to your side a slide pro-
jector, a machine containing cards, and two timers. You will also no-
tice a sheet of paper placed in front of you, a sheet at your side, and
a pencil. When the experiment begins, slides of one paragraph length
each will be projected on the screen. The digits 2 through 9 will be
scattered throughout each paragraph. Simultaneously, cards will be
presented one at a time by the machine to your side. Each card will
also contain one paragraph with the digits 2 through 9 scattered
throughout it. Please note on the appropriate sheet the number of nu-
merals in each paragraph. That is: on the sheet before you, note how
many numerals are on each slide, making your notations in columns from
top to bottom. On the sheet to your side, note how many numerals are
on each card, making each notation in the box whose number corresponds
to the number in the top left-hand corner of the card. In addition, as
you respond to the slides, say your answers as well, so that you may re-
ceive feedback on your accuracy. There is no need to announce your re-
sponses to the card.
Each slide will be p resented on 1 y once . The ca rds to your s i de
will be presented simultaneously with the slides and should be responded
to, as time permits, between the consecutive slide presentations. After
you respond to a card, discard it by placing it off to the side. If you
run out of time between the slides and do not respond to all the cards
which have been presented, the card tray will continue to fill up. You
will notice that the tray is full when cards stack up either beyond the
lip of the tray or on the ramp. When this happens, you must decide whe-
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ther to respond to the cards later on (by removing all of them from the
tray and placing them at the base of the card machine) or to disregard
them completely (by removing all of them from the tray and placing them
off to the side). Of course, you can prevent the tray from filling up
by continuously responding to the cards. However, responses to the
sUdes are "worth" more than responses to the cards
,
for the si ides rep
LSl^Ill the prjmary_ task_. Your score will reflect the accuracy of your
responses, the number of items you respond to, and the time the experi-
ment takes you. Therefore, you should try as much as possible to re-
spond continuously to both the slides and the cards. Please remember,
however
,
that the slides are primary
.
Hence, as the experiment pro-
gresses, you may continue responding to the cards as well as to the
slides, put the cards off for later processing (which will leave less
time for the other sections of the experiment), discard the cards, or
discontinue their presentation by shutting off the timers connected to
the card machine. You may terminate the experiment at any time by no-
tifying me
.
When you conclude the experiment, there will be a short question-
naire to complete regarding your experience of this experiment.
Please repeat these instructions to me so that I can be sure that
they are clear to you. I will also answer any questions you have about
the instructions.
Each subject repeated the instructions in his own words, so that
his comprehension of them could be ascertained. He was then asked to
note the reinforcement value the task had for him (Appendix E)
.
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At this point, the experiment began. The subject was observed via
a one-way mirror. In this way, his method of responding to the experi-
mental task could be followed and strategy changes recorded. Because
the card tray had to be emptied continually, a record of the choice of
strategy made by the subject at each point— i.e., each time he emptied
the tray--could be obtained. Filtering began when the subject first
stacked cards; omitting began when the subject first discarded cards;
shutting off the card machine (partial escape) was noted when the sub-
ject flipped the timers off; and full escape occurred when the subject
asked that the experiment be terminated.
The maximum time the experiment could take was 23 minutes and 20
seconds, or \k00 seconds (Appendix A). The task, therefore, could be
completed within the hour for which the subject had volunteered. As
the experiment progressed, it will be noted, the level of input contin-
uously increased. The subject was first required to process four units
of information in 80 seconds, then four units in 70 seconds, etc., until
by the last stage of the presentation he was required to process two
un i ts of information in ten seconds.
Each subject was scored on the number of slides he responded to
incorrectly ("errors 11 ) as well as the length of time which he actively
controlled the rate of input ("control time"). Control was defined as
either responding to both slides and cards simultaneously or filtering.
Omitting and/or escape, as suggested above, entail a measure of giving
up on some portion of the environmental input and therefore reflect some
loss of cont rol
.
Subjects who stacked cards discovered at the conclusion that they
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were not required to remain and complete the stack by responding to
those cards. Because the cards had been stacked with the intent of re-
turning to them after the slides were completed, the expression of this
intent sufficed for the purposes of the experiment. Hence, after the
subject had responded to three or four of the stacked cards and indi-
cated that he would continue responding to the rest, he was told that
he need not continue with the stacked cards.
At the conclusion of the task, each subject filled out a question-
naire (Appendix F) about his experience of the experiment. He was then
interviewed about his responses to the questionnaire in order to facil-
itate a fuller understanding of the subjective experience of overload.
The subject was then de-briefed both verbally and via a standard form
(Appendix G)
.
When the experiment was satisfactorily explained, the
subject was given his experimental credit and asked to sign a release
for his SAT scores. (Unfortunately, the University's records office did
not recognize this release, as the SAT scores were recorded along with
other confidential information for which no release had been obtained.
Consequently, the accuracy of these scores is based on each subject's
recol 1 ect ion
.
)
Apparatus
The materials which comprised the input were 5^ slides and 1 0
A
cards. The slides were projected from a Kodak ektagraph slide projector
(model B-2). The card-presenting machine was a modified Kodak ektagraph
slide projector (model B-2) which was elevated on a wooden base and sur-
rounding by a wooden collar. A slot was cut in the collar to allow each
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card to drop down onto a ramp and slide into a holding tray. The lip of
the tray allowed k-S cards to stack up; if the cards were not removed,
subsequent cards would slide over the lip and in front of the subject,
thereby reminding him to empty the tray and providing the experimenter
with a continual record of the decision-making process being undertaken.
Attached to the card machine were two Hunter timers which moved the card
carousel forward at 10-second intervals. The slides and cards were pre-
sented according to the schedule presented in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER
I I I
RESULTS
The first part of this section will describe the criteria by which
responses were divided into five strategy categories. The quantitative
results will then be applied to the hypotheses and examined for other
relevant findings.
In response to the experimental task, subjects employed five dif-
ferent strategies. The task was presented in such a format that at the
outset there was sufficient time to respond to both the slides and the
cards. As the rate of presentation increased, different strategies de-
veloped :
Strategy 1 : filtering until the end of the experiment
Individuals employing this strategy let the cards they missed stack
up until the slides were completed and then turned their attention to
completing the stack of cards (n = 15).
Strategy 2: filtering and omitting
This strategy entailed letting the cards stack up to a point be-
yond which any subsequent cards were discarded. The card-presenting
machine, however, was not shut off (n = 9).
Strategy 3: filtering, omitting, and shutting off the card machine
In this strategy, cards were stacked up to a point and subsequent
cards were discarded until card presentation was halted completely by
turning off the card machine (n = h)
.
Strategy L \ : filtering and shutting off the card machine
In this strategy, cards were stacked up to a point, and the pre-
2b
mtltlon of subsequent cards WI1 prevented by immediately turning off
the card machine (without the intermediate step of discarding cards)
(n 9).
S trategy £: escape
This strategy includes all Individuals who elected to terminate
the experiment before all the slides had been presented (n - 3).
The means and standard deviations for each strategy group on each
experimental variable are presented in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about hei
e
The hypotheses were Investigated via correlation, multiple regres-
sion, and analysis of variance. The results of these tests will bt pre
sented as they come to bear on (he hypotheses
•
A correlation matrix was computed to ascertain the Interrelations
between the experiment.il variables. The matrix, which gives a general
picture of these relationships, Is presented in Table 2.
Irr.erl Table 2 about here
The results of the correlations show trends In the direction of
confirming Hypotheses 1 and 3. The negat i vr correlation between locus
of control and control lime and the positive correlation between rein-
forcement value and control time ere both In the predicted direction.
While the significance levels do not meet the required .05, the direc-
tions of the relai ionships support the hypotheses. (A low IE score rep
resents a belief in internal locus of control; hence, the negative cor-
relational trend suggests n positive relation belween i n tenia I i ty and
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TABLE 1
Means and Standa rd Deviations for Each
Accord ing to Strategy
Strategy 1 2 2 4 5 Popul at ion
IE
C
9.33a L
(3.94) b
10. 1 1
(3.33)
10.00
(4.08)
1 1 .00
(4.95)
1 3 00
(3.61) (3.98)
GES d 98.93
C5.47)
97.77
(3.99)
96.25
(8.85)
96.33
(3.24)
102 67
(9-29)
q£ 1 nyo
. 1 U
(5.44)
RVe 3.67
(0.82)
3.56
(1.13)
3.50
(0.58)
3.56
(0.73)
2 67
(0.58) (0.85)
GPAf 2.796
(0.33)
3.17
(0.53)
2.68
(0.26)
2.67
(0.34)
2 2k
(1.13)
? 7QQ
(0.503)
SATV9 529.67
(75.89)
m.kk
(87.34)
490.00
(1 18.32)
500.56
(57.80)
SOS 67
(125.83)
2 u / . z 5
(80.99)
SATQh 522.67
(81.54)
553.33
(69.46)
567.50
(80.57)
573.89
(80.38)
536 67
(119.30) (79.91)
•
SATT 1 1052.33
( 1 38 08)
1037.78 1057.50
(190.50)
1085.56
(145.16)
1043.33
(237. 14)
1056.38
(145.60)
ERRORSJ 24. 13
(7.07)
27.67
(7.86)
26.00
(4.08)
20.67
(11.46)
12.67
(4.16)
23.47
(8.68)
CONTROL k
TIME (in
seconds)
1400.
(0)
994.44
(216.46)
755.00
(285.95)
1 138.89
(1 12.83)
610.00
(85.44)
1 126.25
(294.75)
a
mean
^standard deviation
^Score on Rotter IE scale (Appendix C)
d Score on Hale-Fibel GES scale (Appendix D)
Re i nfor cement va 1 ue
^Grade point average
9SAT-verbal
.SAT-quant i tat i ve
[ SAT-total
^Number of incorrect slide responses
Time in control of i nput
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TABLE 2
Pearson Correlation Coefficients*
« RV GPA SATV SATQ SATT ERRORS
IE 10000
.0025 -.0739
-.2184
-.0322
.3689 1924 ,770 ?nRc
.uui s-.^94 s-.325 s=.088 s=.422 s=.010 s=. U 7 s=. 1 37 s=.098
GES K ?°? 0 -- 28°3 --0590 -.2511
-.1839
-.1406 1437(0) (*<» W (40) (40) (40 40) (40
s-.OO! s=.128 s=.040 s=.359 s=.059 ,-. 128 s=.193 s= J88
RV
'0957 .0235 .0666
.0595 .0419 .2166
(*0) (40) (40) (40) (40) (40)
s-.OOl s=.278 s=.443 s=. 3 4l s=.358 s=.399 s=.090
GPA
• 1-0000
.2730 .1934 .2566 .4224 1212
(°) (^0) (40) (40) (40) (40)
s=.001 s=.044 s=.ll6 s=.055 s=.003 s=.228
SATV 1.0000
.5365 .8622 .1924 .1634
(0) (40) (40) (40) (40)
s=.001 s=.001 s=.001 s=.H7 s =. 1 57
SATQ KOOO .8811 .3218 -.1212
(0) (40) (40) (40)
s=.001 s=.001 s=. 02 1 s=.228
SATT 1.0000 .2929 .0234
(0) (40) (40)
s=.001 s=.033 s=.443
ERR0RS 1.0000 .1606
(0) (40)
5--=. 001 s= . 1 61
CONTROL 1>0000
TIME (0)
s=.001
"One-ta i 1 ed
*
**s
i
gn i fi cance 1 eve 1
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exerting control over the information for some length of time. A high
reinforcement value score indicates a feeling that the task is import-
ant, reflected by the time spent in control of the task.)
Hypothesis 2-the effect of GES on control time—was not confirmed
at a significant level by the correlational results, although the re-
sults were in the predicted direction. However, a median split suggest-
ed that the effect might best be studied by a t-test. The population
was divided at the median, with the 18 low-GES individuals whose mean
control time was 1018 seconds being compared to the 22 high-GES individ-
uals whose mean was 1215 seconds. The results indicate that this dif-
ference is significant (t = 2.21, df = 38, p < .05), confirming Hypo-
thesis 2 and illustrating the influence of GES on the amount of time
spent in control of the input.
Significant positive correlations were found between errors and
grade point average (r = .4:2, p < .01), Scholastic Aptitude Test-quanti-
tative (r = .32, p < .05), and Scholastic Aptitude Test-total (r = .29,
p < .05). Apparently, individuals who were superior on these measures
made significantly more errors on the slides. Some relation exists,
then, between academic achievement and number of errors made.
Generalized expectancy for success correlated negatively with grade
point average, suggesting that individuals who do better scholasti cal ly
do not general ly expect to do well, and that individuals who do have a
generalized expectancy for success do not do as well scholasti cal ly.
Perhaps the academic achievement of the former group is to compensate
for their generalized expectancy of non-success, while individuals in
the latter group do not consider academic achievement to be a signifi-
29
cant factor in thei r world-view.
The effects of the other experimental variables on the dependent
variables errors and control time were investigaced by multiple regres-
sion. This analysis allows for the determination of the specific con-
tributions of each variable to the criterion dependent variable.
Insert Table 3 about here
Grade point average and IE both contributed significantly to the
error score, and were therefore the best predictors of errors in this
study. (Because the SAT scores could not be verified, there might be
some question as to their accuracy. It is likely that more subjects re-
called their grade point averages accurately, as those were of more re-
cent consequence than their SAT examinations, which subjects had taken
up to several years prior to the experiment. Hence, the grade point
averages were studied more extensively. However, because they too were
based on recall, there was still a chance of dissimulation on the part
of subjects. This suggests that the effects of grade point average and
SAT should possibly be re- i nves t
i
gated under conditions where their ac-
curacy can be based on more than personal recall.)
A t-test was used to determine the effect of IE on errors. A medi-
an split divided the population into 21 internals and 19 externals. The
mean error score for the internals was 21.05 and for the externals 26.16
This difference was significant (t = 1.92, df = 38, p < .05) using a dl-
rect i ona 1 test
.
The multiple regression of the other variables on control time is
presented in Table ^.
30
TABLE 3
Multiple Regression of Variables on Errors
able entered F to enter Significance R square Overall F Significance
GPA 8 - 2 5 .007 .178 8.25 .007
,E 3.78 .060 .255 6.32 .oo'i
SAT0
~
-97 .331 .21h 4.53 .009
GES
-03 .87A .27h 3-31 .021
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Insert Table k about here
Reinforcement value, IE, and GES all contributed to control time,
although not dramatically. This result supports the three hypotheses of
the study and is supported by the correlations and the finding, cited
above, that high-GES individuals controlled the input significantly
longer than did low-GES individuals.
To summarize the results mentioned so far: Internality, high gen-
eralized expectancy for success, and a belief that the task was import-
ant all influenced in a positive direction the amount of time spent in
control of the input. More errors were made by externals and by high
academic achievers. These findings suggest that errors resulted from
some sort of carelessness rather than from low reading ability or low
academic achievement. Perhaps the combination of performance feedback
and speed of presentation exacerbated the effects of overload by raising
pe r forman ce anxi ety
.
Because "strategy" was not a continuous variable, its effects could
not be studied by multiple regression. Consequent ly , analyses of vari-
ance were computed for the effect of strategy on errors and on control
t i me.
Insert lable 5 about here
An effect of strategy on errors was found (p < .10). To see if the
effect was due simply to the extreme scores, a Duncan's mu 1 t i p le- range
test was employed. This test compares all the group means and deter-
TABLE 4
Multiple Regression of Variables on Control Ti
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e en tered F to enter Sign if i cance R square OveraJlF S i qn i f
i
RV 1 .87
.179 .047 1.87
.179
IE 1 .50 .228 .084 1.70 .197
GES 1.39 .246 .118 1.61 .204
SATV 1 .09 • 304 1*5 1.48 .229
SATQ
• 90
• 3^9 . 167 1.36 .263
GPA
• 3^ .562 .175 1.17 .346
SATT
.070
.795 .421 1 .18 • 338
TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance Errors by Strategy
Source of Vari at i on
Main effects
St rategy
Res i dua
1
Total
Sum of Squares df
611.575 4
2328.400 35
2939.975 39
Mean Squa
152.89*+
66.526
75.384
*P < . 10
3**
mines which are significantly different from each other. 'All the means
that are presented in a single subset are not significantly different
from each other; two means are significantly different from each other
only if they appear in separate subsets.
Insert Table 6 about here
The effect found was due to a comparison of the extreme error
scores of Strategies 2 and 5 and may be explained by the reduced expo-
sure of Strategy 5, for escape reduced the number of slides to which one
was exposed.
The analysis of variance of strategy on control time is presented
in Table 7*
Insert Table 7 about here
A significant effect of strategy on control time was found (p <
.01). Duncan's mult
i
pie- range test was utilized to see if this effect
was due simply to the extreme scores.
Insert Table 8 about here
With the exception of Strategies 3 and 5, all other groups have
mean control times which differ significantly from each other. This
effect, then, is not due solely to the fact that individuals in Strategy
1 exerted control for the entire experiment. Interestingly, individuals
in Strategy k 9 who ultimately gave up, initially controlled for a signi-
ficantly longer time than did individuals in Strategy 2.
The raw data (Table 1) suggested testing the effect of strategy on
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TABLE 6
Duncan Multiple Range Test* Errors by Strategy
Subset 1
Group mean
Subset 2
Group mean
Strategy 5
12.6667
Strategy k
20.6667
Strategy h
20.6667
Strategy 1
2h. 1333
Strategy 1
2k. 1333
Strategy 3
26.0000
Strategy 3
26.0000
Strategy 2
27.6667
*p < .05
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance Control Time by Strategy
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df
_
Mean Square F
Main effects
Strategy 2632726.389 k 658181.597 30.495*
Residual 755^11.111 35 21583. 1 75
Tota1 3388137.500 39 86875.321
*P < .01
Subset 1
Group mean
TABLE 8
Duncan Multiple Range Test*
Control Time (in seconds) by Strategy
Strategy 5 Strategy 3
610.0000 755.0000
Subset 2
Group mean
Strategy 2
SSk.kkkk
Subset 3
Group mean
Strategy k
1 138.8889
Subset 4
Group mean
Strategy 1
1400.0000
*p < .05
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grade point average. The results are presented in Table 9.
Insert Table 9 about here
A main effect of strategy on grade point average was found (p <
.05). Duncan's multiple- range test (Table 10) indicated that this ef-
fect was also due to the extreme groups.
Insert Table 10 about here
The mean grade point average of individuals who employed Strategy
2 is significantly different (p < .05) from that of individuals who em-
ployed either Strategy h or Strategy 5. Apparently, the "smartest 11 in-
dividuals chose to follow the increasing pace of the experiment by mov-
ing from filtering to omitting without that resulting in a move to es-
cape by shutting off the card machine.
The effects of GES on control time and of strategy on control time
suggested the possibility of an interaction between them. Consequently,
an analysis of variance was computed and is presented in Table 11.
Insert Table 11 about here
The two-way interaction of GES and strategy on control time was
significant (p < .05). Differences among the means were again deter-
mined by a Duncan's multiple-range test (Table 12).
Insert Table 12 about here
Individuals with a low GES controlled for a significantly shorter
time in Strategies 2 and 3 then did high-GES individuals employing those
TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance
Grade Point Average by Strategy
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square
Main effects
Strategy 2.402 k .601
Residual 7.473 35 .214
Total 9.875 39 .253
*p < .05
TABLE 10
Duncan Multiple Range Test*
Grade Point Average by Strategy
Subset 1
Strategy 5 Strategy k Strategy 3 Strategy 1
Group mean 2.2400 2.6733 2.6750 2.7960
Subset 2
Strategy 3 Strategy 1 Strategy 2
Group mean 2.6750 2.7960 3-1733
*p < .05
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance
Control Time by Generalized Expectancy for Success by Strategy
S ource of Variation
Main effects
GES
S t rategy
Two-way interactions
GES by Strategy
Res i dual
Total
Sum of Squares d_f
164739.015 1
2412389.015 4
173368.763 4
417303.333 30
3388137-500 39
Mean Square F_
164739-015 11.843*
603097.254 43.357*
43342.191 3.116**
13910. Ill
86875.321
*p < .01
**p < .05
TABLE 12
Duncan Multiple Range Test-
Control Time (in seconds) by Generalized Expectancy for Success by Strategy
Subset 1
Low GES-Strategy 3 High 3 GES-Strategy 5 Low GES-Strategy 5
Group mean 575.0000 605.0000 620.0000
Subset 2
Low GES-Strategy 5 Low GES-Strategy 2
Group mean 620.0000 866.0000
Subset 3
Low GES-Strategy 2 High GES-Strategy 3
Group mean 866.0000 935.0000
Subset k
High GES-Strategy 3 Low GES-Strategy k
Group mean 935-0000 1103-3333
Subset 5
Low GES-Strategy k High GES-Strategy 2 High GES-Strategy k
Group mean 1103-3333 1155-0000 1210.0000
Subset 6
Low GES-Strategy 1 High GES-Strategy 1
Group mean 1400.0000 1^00.0000
abased on lower and upper halves of population.
*p < .05
h3
strategies. This, then, is a behavioral measure of generalized expect-
ancy for success, at least for these two strategies.
Finally, the effect of strategy on perceived experimental duration
was studied by an analysis of variance.
Insert Table 13 about here
There was no significant effect of strategy selected on the response
made to the first part of post-experimental question #3: "How long do
you think you worked on this task?"
TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance
Perceived Experimental Duration by Strategy
S ource of Variation
Main effects
St rategy
Res i dua
1
Total
Sum of Squares df
465400.0000 4
5344640.0000 35
5810040.0000 39
Mean Square
1 16350.0000
152704.0000
148975.385
*p < .05
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Analys is of the Fi ve Strategies
The most striking result is that subjects generated five different
strategies to the same experimental situation. The task instructions
were intentionally vague to allow for this result. The key phrase of
the instructions, in this regard, is the sentence which describes how
one's "score" will be computed. Upon reflection, the reader will notice
a discrepancy in the components of the score: obviously, an increase in
the number of i terns- responded to will ipso facto increase one's time
score. The instructions were worded in this way so as to allow each
individual to read in the meaning which would be manifested in the ap-
proach he would take. Hence, some of the participants weighted the time
score heavily, and took steps to keep that part of the total score down;
others focused on responding to as many items as they could, regardless
of the extra time this would entail. To further illustrate these dis-
tinctions, the post-experimental interviews were examined to understand
the very different processes by which each individual responded to the
experimental requi rements
.
St rategy Jj cont rol
The fifteen individuals who filtered until the end of the experi-
ment, stacking the cards they did not have time to respond to as the
slides were presented, explained their behavior in terms of a defini-
tion of performance which stressed completing a_M_ aspects of the experi-
ment. Each individual who used this strategy defined the best possible
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score as one in which all items received a response. The increased time
this response would take was not of major concern to them, for a variety
of reasons. They sounded confident that completing the stacked cards
would not dramatically increase their time scores, even though the aver-
age number of cards stacked by members of this group was approximately
70! (This number was computed by determining the average length of time
individuals in this group did both tasks simultaneously and using Appen-
dix A to determine the number of cards presented from that time until
the conclusion of the experiment.) This fits weil with the finding men-
tioned above that high-GES individuals controlled the input significant-
ly longer than did low-GES indi viduals—apparent ly , confidence in one's
abilities at effecting success was reflected behavioral ly in the approach
taken in this experiment. These individuals further felt that their ac-
curacy in responding to the stack would be improved once the slides were
no longer being presented, and that this increase in accuracy would out-
weigh any negative effects of their increased time score.
Another reason mentioned by Strategy 1 individuals for maintaining
a filtering strategy is a desire to remain competitive with the chal-
lenge offered by the experiment. They were aware of pressure during the
experiment, in that two tasks demanded response from them, but took the
approach that they would not let the experiment "defeat" them. Rather,
they accepted the challenge and instructed themselves, in the words of
one member of this group, "Don't give up— don't let this thing get the
better of you." In the words of another, "I just tried to keep my cool."
They exerted some sort of control over the situation by telling them-
selves that the slides would eventually run out and then there would be
hi
an opportunity to catch up on the stack. While this would increase the
time spent in the experiment, in the words of a member of this strategy
group, "What's important is not how quickly you do the job, but to do it
well." As another put it, "A job worth doing is worth doing right."
For this group, "doing right" meant achieving mastery and control by
leaving no card unturned. They responded to the perceived challenge by
adopting a strategy aimed at completing the job they felt the experiment
demanded.
St rategy 2_: compromise
The nine individuals who adopted Strategy 2 moved from filtering to
omitting at some point during the experiment, but did not shut off the
card-presenting machine at any point. These individuals reported being
caught in a bind. On the one hand, they were concerned about the effect
on their time scores of remaining after the slides were completed to re-
spond to a large stack of cards. They mentioned stacking the cards up
to a point where they became concerned about the experiment taking too
much time; at that point, they began omitting cards. On the other hand,
shutting off the card machine would have meant giving up on the possi-
bility that the slides would slow down, thereby allowing them to respond
to the cards once again. Making the i rrevocable decision to shut the
machine "seemed like an easy out--a blow to the ego to admit I couldn't
do it. It would have meant admitting failure." There were also post-
hoc rationalizations justifying the correctness of this decision:
"There was no way I could do both. I didn't think it was that import-
ant to keep reading the cards later on. I thought I did well enough,
and what I did was okay." The objective behavior of individuals in this
48
group indicated some degree of giving up on a section of input; but to
the people who selected this strategy, that decision did not, imply giv-
ing up. Shutting off the machine carried that implication; omitting was
felt to be a compromise between that portion of the score that demanded
response to all input and that portion which advocated a conservative
approach to the time element of the experiment.
Two interesting differences appear between Strategy 1 individuals
and Strategy 2 individuals. The first group anticipated an end to the
experiment, and stacked the cards in anticipation of that end. To them,
the experiment apparently had a clear end-point, which the anticipated
termination of the slide presentation would signal; once this first end-
point was reached, full attention could be devoted to the stacked cards.
When the stacked cards were completed, the experiment would be over. In
contrast to that approach, individuals in Strategy 2 seemed to feel,
based on the interview data, that the experiment was, in some ways, in-
terminable or beyond their control. At best, they hoped for a slowing
down of the rate of slide presentation, which would allow them to resume
responding to the cards. They did not, however, anticipate being in con
trol of the experiment past the point when the slides were finished. At
that point, they felt, the experiment was over, and keeping at it by re-
sponding to extra cards would adversely affect their total score. At
least to this extent, then, individuals who used Strategy 2 manifested
some degree of overload: they felt so caught up in what was going on
that they were unable to respond in ways that would return control of
the experiment to them . When the end did come, it signalled relief from
the input rather than, as it did to individuals in Strategy 1, an oppor-
tunity to continue working to improve one's score.
Along these lines, Strategy 2 individuals felt the time that the
experiment would take to be more oppressive than did Strategy 1 individ-
uals, and the performance of Strategy 2 individuals manifested this be-
lief. They omitted so as not to exceed what they perceived to be the
time limitations of the task; Strategy 1 individuals, on the other hand,
decided that responding to all the input would make up for the increased
time those responses would take. This difference in time perception,
however, was not reflected in the responses given to question 3 of the
post-experimental questionnaire. There were no significant differences
among the strategy groups in terms of how long them felt they had worked
on the task (Table 13). Apparently, time exerted pressure during the
experiment and motivated some individuals to stop filtering and start
omitting; but, once the task was completed, this pressure was relieved,
and all individuals felt that they had worked roughly the same amount of
time. (The composition of Group 5 seems to have confounded any signifi-
cant effect that might have been obtained. Group 5 was composed of
three people, two of whom felt they had worked 10 minutes and one who
responded "20 minutes" to question 3- Because the number of people in
this group was so small, the one deviant response apparently biased the
mean and prevented the attainment of a significant effect.)
Strategy 3 : continuous tightening of the filter
The four individuals who utilized Strategy 3 followed the hypothe-
sized "classic" pattern of response to overload. When the rate of pre-
sentation became too fast to allow simultaneous response to both slides
and cards, they shifted to a filtering strategy. As the stack grew, so
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did their concern about the extra tinre the experiment would take if they
remained to respond to the stacked cards. This motivated a shift to
omitting subsequent cards, in the interests of saving time. Where this
group differed from Group 2, however, is that we now have, in Strategy
group 3, the first overt behavioral signs of overload: shutting off the
card machine. Omitting, it should be remembered, did not stop the cards
from being presented; the people in this group mentioned the distracting
and interfering effect the continuing card presentation had on their
ability to attend to the slides. Shutting off the card machine, then,
represented a decision to forfeit some input in order to ensure adequate
performance on the rest.
The people who used Strategy 3 emphasized the stress the instruc-
tions had placed on the primary task, thereby justifying their forfeit-
ure of the secondary task. They felt that only this kind of shutting-
down could see them through the remainder of the experiment. This de-
cision also helped alleviate the subjective feeling of overload: "I
said to heck with them (the cards), because I glanced up and saw how
many cards were left. 11 Shutting off the card machine, in the words of
another subject, really helped: "I was more relaxed near the end (of
the experiment) because I didn't have to concentrate on the cards."
Thus, this strategy represents the continuous controlled "tightening" of
the filtering mechanism mentioned earlier, via successively more strin-
gent reductions in the amount of input impinging on the individual.
St rategy k: from control to overload
The most interesting feature of the performance of the nine indi-
viduals who selected Strategy A is that they had initially been in con-
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trol of the experiment (keeping up with stimulus presentations via si-
multaneous processing and filtering) for an average of almost 19 min-
utes, placing them second only to Group 1 on this measure (Table 8).
Why, then, did they give up so close to the end? The interviews sug-
gest that, in Group k, overload was more severe than in any previous
group. Almost all the subjects in this group mentioned feeling that
the presentation of the cards became very distracting, and that con-
tinued filtering would have meant falling even further behind (time-
wise) than they had already. Thus, the intermediate step of omitting,
found in Group 3, is missing. The cards assumed a negative connotation:
"Everything was going too fast and i couidn't concentrate on the slides.
There were too many cards and I couldn't be bothered with them." An-
other subject reported: "I felt I couldn't keep up with the pace they
(the cards) were being dropped at." Even more extreme is this comment:
"It was physical ly impossible (italics mine) to keep responding to the
cards (when the slides came right after each other)." Thus, the deci-
sion to stop filtering was reached when feelings of overload became very
powerful to these individuals. Because the intermediate step of omit-
ting did not offer enough relief from the distracting effects of the
cards, they moved immediately to shutting off the card machine. That
the feeling of overload was very real to members of this group was mani-
fested both objectively (in that they "gave up" an average of only four
minutes from the end, and could see that only 2k cards were left) and
subjectively (in their comments about the impossibility of continuing
without forfeiting a portion of input).
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Strate gy 5: escape
Three individuals terminated the experiment before all the slides
had been presented. Interestingly, they followed three different pat-
terns preceding their escape. One moved from filtering to omitting to
shutting off the card machine before deciding to terminate the experi-
ment; one tried filtering and omitting to cut down successively on the
amount of input before terminating; and the third moved directly from
filtering to termination. Thus, within this group itself are illus-
trated the varying methods of attempting to assume control before the
realization that the task was beyond one's present capacities. The
post-experimental interviews with these individuals are eloquent in
their descriptions of overload: "I was too frazzled to want to con-
tinue"; "The numbers just began to overwhelm me"; ". . .and those
things (the cards) kept jumping at me. It seemed like there was too
much to do.
. .1 was getting all jumbled up and missing a lot of stuff.
1 just got tired mentally of doing this stuff, so I figured I had
enough." (Much care was taken in de-briefing these individuals and
attempting to dissipate any stress the experiment had aroused.)
From the viewpoint of attempting to respond to all the experiment-
al input, these five strategies represent successively less adaptive
mechanisms of response. Strategy 1 individuals could make up the input
they had missed, and exerted control to ensure that outcome. Strategy
2 individuals felt that, within the present structure, full response
was impossible, but hoped that the structure might change to allow re-
sponse. However, they gave up some of their own control by deciding
that they could not work past the conclusion of the slides. In Strate-
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gy 3 is the first appearance of an overload-motivated shutdown: one
part of the input is irrevocably forfeited in the interests of another.
Strategy k illustrates the disruptive effects of overload most clearly:
giving up (by shutting off the card machine) when the end was very much
within reach. Finally, Strategy 5 represents the clear decision to
pi.ice one's requirements for self-protection or self-esteem ahead of
externally-defined task requirements. Interestingly, from this per-
spective Strategy 5 is probably very adaptive: it does not get the job
done, but perhaps sometimes throwing one's hands up is the only viable
option that remains.
Quant i tat i ve Resu l ts
The negative correlational trend between externality and time in
control (Table 2) and the finding that internals made significantly
fewer errors than externals suggest that individuals who held internal
expectancies manifested their sense of control in at least two ways in
this experiment. They selected strategies that would allow them to re-
main "on top of" the input by responding carefully to the primary task
wi t hou t for f e i t i ng the secondary task in the process . Thus
,
they sat i s-
fied two of the experimental requirements: they responded to many Items
and did so accurately. This type of control is similar to that men-
tioned by individuals who selected Strategy I: the extra time the ex-
periment would take was not as significant a factor as the feeling of
having done the job and done it well. There appears to be, then, a very
strong similarity between the decision-making processes of internals
and the individuals who selected Strategy 1.
5**
The behavioral manifestation of a high generalized expectancy for
success is interesting. High-GES individuals controlled the input sig-
nificantly longer than did low-GES individuals, reflecting attempts at
gaining mastery. A past history of successful dealings with the envir-
onment, then, appears to be an important factor in one's current con-
fidence in one's abilities to do the same in any situation.
There are some indications, however, that this type of control--
disregarding the time factor in favor of increased volume of response
and increased accuracy-might have been a gamble which the "smartest"
individuals preferred not to take. The negative correlation between
grade point average and generalized expectancy for success (Table 2) is
one indication of this. Perhaps high-GES individuals controlled for as
long as they did in order to compensate for some anxieties the task-
given in an academic set t i ng--aroused in them. Perhaps, as mentioned
above, high-GES individuals do not consider academic achievement to be
significant in their world-view, whereas low-GES individuals strive to
do well academically to make up for their generalized expectancy of non-
success. Studying hard in order to do well appears to the low-GES
group to be a way of ensuring success in at least one area of their
lives. Whatever the explanation, there is one more indication that the
type of control represented by Strategy 1 was not selected by the
"smartest" individuals. Table 10 illustrates that the group with the
highest mean grade point average selected Strategy 2. The mean grade
point average of that group is the highest of all five, and significant-
ly higher (p < .05) than the means of Groups *4 and 5. Apparently, there
was something about Strategy 2 that made it attractive to subjects with
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high grade point averages. Perhaps the compromise Strategy 2 represents
was the feature that struck the people who utilized it. As mentioned
above, filtering resulted in an increased time score, which threatened
Strategy 2 subjects. Shutting off the machine implied complete forfeit-
ure of a section of input— a step that was too drastic for these aca-
demic achievers. Omitting, though, allowed them to restrict the input
in the interests of time and accuracy while keeping open the option of
increasing the total number of items to which they would response (i.e.,
If the presentation rate slowed down). Thus, these individuals at-
tempted to cover all the bases in a way which manifested less outright
control than Strategy 1, but which was more in contact, from a conser-
vative viewpoint, with all the elements of the experimentally-defined
rea 1 i ty .
The pos i t i ve cor re 1 at i on a 1 t rend between re i nfor cement va 1 ue and
time in control (Table 2) serves as a good illustration of the behav-
ioral manifestation of reinforcement value--!. e., the greater the im-
portance the subject assigned to the task, the longer he controlled the
input. Thus, the present study has illustrated the effect on behavior
of both expectancy of reinforcement (as measured by GES) and reinforce-
ment value mentioned in Rotter's functional theory of behavior.
The two-way interaction that is of interest is the effect of gen-
eralized expectancy for success and strategy on control time (Table 11),
The results indicate that individuals who had a high GES and used Stra-
tegies 2 and 3 controlled the input significantly longer than individ-
uals with a low GES who used those strategies. The effect of general-
ized expectancy for success on control time, then, is most pronounced
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for these two strategies. This may be because Strategies 2 and 3 are
the only ones which allowed for that kind of variability in control
time. Strategies 1 and k both involved a significant amount of control
over the input; Strategy 5 resulted from a loss of control. Only in
Strategies 2 and 3 could the individual be both a part of (by filtering)
and not a part of (by omitting and/or shutting the card machine) the ex-
periment for relatively equal durations; in simpler terms, the individual
truly could filter "as long as he wanted." (Obviously, every person
could filter as long as he wanted. The thrust of the argument, though,
is that Strategies 1 and h reflect a high control time independent of
GES; conversely, Strategy 5 reflects a low control time independent of
GES. Only in Strategies 2 and 3 could the effect of GES appear to a
significant extent.) Hence, Strategies 2 and 3 were the only ones
which allowed "space" for the effects of a high generalized expectancy
for success to appear and significantly increase the control time score.
Responses to Ove r 1 oad and I mpl i cat ions for Psychopathology
Weick (1970, p. 68) defines overload as "the perceived inability
to maintain a one-to-one relationship between input and output within a
realizable future, given an existing repertoire of practices and de-
sires." The present experiment has illustrated how that "perceived in-
ability" can develop and has suggested some factors that contribute to
differences in that perception. It has also illustrated how people
modify their prattices in order to re-establish some level of control
over the input. This modification of pract i ces--s t ra teg i es--undertaken
in order to keep up with the input results from the continuous defini-
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tion and re-definition of the environment which Weick ascribes to the
individual encountering a potentially overloading situation. An under-
standing of an individual's reaction to overload must therefore take
into account both one's observable behavior as well as the scheme of
which this behavior is a manifestation. The strategies discussed in
this study reflect qualitatively different schemes-broadly
,
responding
to all input versus responding to a portion of the input versus rejec-
tion of all input. The factors involved in the development of those
different schemes are therefore significant for our understanding of the
subjective feeling of overload.
The most important factor influencing one's response to the experi-
mentally-induced overload discussed in this study is the type of control
which the individual assumes over the informational environment. Inter-
nal ity reflects one kind of perceived control of reinforcement; a gener-
alized expectancy for success, too, reflects control and a confidence in
one's ability to achieve that control and mastery. The different strate-
gies, however, reflected different judgments about the level of control
that was attainable in the experimental situation. Moving through Stra-
tegies 1 through 5, each group showed successively greater effects of
overload; each group moved more toward self-protection and showed less
concern for the external demands which the experiment made of them. One
effect of overload, then, can be the development of a sense of the po-
tential danger to oneself of remaining in a situation which is bombard-
ing one with more input than can be handled. The options open to this
individual require the exertion of some sort of control, either by re-
asserting oneself (as in Strategy I) or by restricting the volume of in-
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put (Strategies 2-5), The individual continuously monitors the effects
of his/her behavior and maintains flexibility by being prepared further
to modify the practices selected (i.e., change strategies) as time goes
on. However, based on the findings of this study, it is suggested that
once the decision is made to "submit" to the level of input (by restrict-
ing it), further modifications are aimed only at further restrictions of
the input. The individual replaces a general scope of the situation
with a narrow one whose purpose is self-maintenance at the expense of
envi ronmental demands. The progression suggested here is a kind of
downhill slide whose final result can often be the type of escape ex-
hib i ted in Strategy 5.
Of course, rescuing oneself is a highly adaptive act, unless that
decision is made prematurely and from a position of relative weakness.
One is reminded of the neurotic, who adheres to fixed ways of responding
partly because of the risk entailed in experimentation with new modes of
behavior. S/he is acting adaptively in the adequate fulfillment of the
demands of life, but is unaware of the variety of options available for
fuller functioning. Thus, the neurotic is being "saved" and protected,
but is simultaneously being cut off from a wider variety of experiences
and input. The neurosis develops, then, as an attempt to maintain inte-
grity in a changing world by adhering to fixed, "safe" patterns of behav-
ior. The "bombardment" of the world's ambiguity further strengthens the
neurotic's adherence to these patterns.
In the schizophrenic, the process is more extreme. McReynolds
(I960) speaks of a perceptual izat ion deficit in sch i zophren i a where i
n
the schizophrenic experiences anxiety resulting from a high level of un-
rem
new
r
; I
-
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assimilated input. He describes the schizophrenic break as Afunctional
sensory deprivation" (p. 262): the level of input becomes so high that
self-protection motivates a shutdown of the system and Withdrawal f
the world. This breakdown can also result in the development of a
(delusional) conceptual structure by which to organize the unass!
lated inputs, the "looseness" of the structure facilitating such assimi-
lation. But the first step is an avoidance of and withdrawal from the
world in order to reduce the level of input to manageable levels.
The present study has attempted to illustrate what the breakdown
of the filter and the resulting bombardment and overload might look
like. A further parallel between the experiment and McReynold's expla-
nation of schizophrenic withdrawal is in the bind presented to the in-
dividual. Bateson, Jackson, Haley, and Weakland (1356) implicate the
"double bind" in the etiology of schizophrenia: the pre-schizophreni
c
child receives contradictory messages from a parent and is unable to
comment on the contradiction. The child is in a no-win situation in
that any action taken can have negative repercussions. The experimental
subject was in a similar bind. Given the demands of the experiment, he
had to perform at some level, such performance being implicit in his de-
cision to participate. Any decision made about how to deal with the in-
put affected the "score"--usually negatively, as a decision to increase
one component of the score resulted in a decrease on another component
of it. The subject could comment on this bind only by changing his
strategy or by terminating the experiment, each of which would again
have consequences for whatever performance measure was being utilized.
The strategies reflected the steps taken to assume control over this
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bind or to submi t to it.
Thus, some subjects withstood overload while others gave up. In a
similar vein, while many individuals feel the bombardments and stress of
life, not all become schizophrenic. This study has i 1 1 us t rated what
some of the significant factors might be in the development of a "life
strategy" to enable one to withstand the potentially detrimental effects
of overload. Central to this strategy is the notion of perceived con-
trol, manifested here by internality and a generalized expectancy for
success. One's sense of being able to exert significant control over
one's environment and modify it to one's advantage is a developmental
task whose significance cannot be understated. A premature or incom-
plete resolution of that task might be a factor in the "surrender" of
the schizophrenic.
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APPENDIX A
Presentation Schedule
pR C 1 S 1 1 Sib C65 S35 C85
PQ C "7O / C2 1 C46 C66 SA6
ci.
PQ C32 S23 C67 S37 C87
r l PO A C33 p J. O r* f CiC68 S 38 C88
r? p i n P O 1 C 1 o S 1 / C49 S24 C69 S39 C89
p l n c R r n I,C34 C50 C70 S^tO C90
p l l <; R C35 C51 r* o f*S25 C71 S 4
1
C9
1
CI p i l POO b 1 0 C52 L72 $42 C92
C12 C23 SI" 3 C53 S26 C73 S43 C93
Ck
P 1 9 roll P O "7 C74 S44 C94
S5 S9 C38 519 C55 S27 C75 C95
S9 p onC39 C56 C/D S'4b C96
C5 C13 C25 s 14 C57 S28 C77 S^7 C97
C5 C]k C26 S20 C58 C78 S48 C98
C6 C15 C27 C4l C59 S29 C79 S^9 C99
C6 S6 S10 Ch2 C60 S30 C80 S50 C100
S6 S10 S15 S21 Cbl S 31 C81 S51 C101
C7 C 16 C28 C43 C62 S32 C82 S52 C102
C7 C17 C29 C63 S33 C83 S53 C 103
C8 C18 C30 S22 C84 S5^ CI OA
=sli de
;
hence
,
Sl=f i rst s 1 i de
,
S22= twenty-second !5 1 i de
,
etc.
**C=card; hence, Cl=first card, C22=twenty-second slide, etc.
NOTE : Each entry on the schedule represents an exposure of 10
seconds . Hence , slide 5 was presented for 20 seconds, and slide 35 was
presented for 10 seconds; card 5 was presented for 20 seconds, and card
35 was presented for 10 seconds. To summarize the presentation sche-
dule:
ON-duration in seconds OFF-duration in seconds S 1 i des
20 60 1"2
20 50 3"4
20 30 5-10
10 30 H-16
10 20 17-22
in 10 23-28
APPENDIX B
r
Informed Consent Form
I understand that the purpose of today's experiment is to study
the way individuals process information. I realize that I may termin-
ate the experiment at any time without penalty. I expect to receive a
full description of the project and its implications as part of my par
t i ci pat i on
.
I agree to participate in this study.
N ame Date Student number
GPA: SAT: V
__Q Jotal
Age
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APPENDIX C
Soci al React i on I nventory
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain im-portant events in our society affect different people. Each item con-
sists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the one
statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe
to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one
you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you
should choose or the one you would like to be true. This is a measure
of personal belief: obviously there are no right or wrong answers.
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much time
on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Find the
number of the item on the answer sheet and black-in the space under the
number 1 or 2 which you choose as the statement more true.
In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements
or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more strong
ly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to re-
spond to each item independently when making your choice; do not be in-
fluenced by your previous choices.
). a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too
much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents
are too easy with them.
2. a_. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to
bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3* a. One cf the major reasons why we have wars is because people
don't take enough interest in politics.
b_. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to pre-
vent them.
k. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this
world.
b* Unfortunate ly , an i nd i vi dua
1
1
s worth often passes un recogn i zed
no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The ? dea that teachers are unfai r to students is nonsense,
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades
are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
F. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advan-
tage of their opportunities.
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No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
People who can't get others to like them don't understand how
to get along with others.
Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're
1 i ke
.
I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making
a decision to take a definite course of action.
in the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if
ever such a thing as an unfair test.
Many times exam quetions tend to be so unrelated to course work
that studying is really useless.
Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck as little or
nothing to do wi th it.
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place
at the right time.
The average citizen can have an influence in government deci-
s ions
.
This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not
much the little guy can do about it.
When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them
work.
It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things
turn out to be a matter of good or baH fortune anyhow.
There are certain people who are just no good.
There is some good in everybody.
In my case getting what i want has little or nothing to do with
1 uck
.
Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping
a coin.
Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough
to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck
has little or nothing to do with it.
As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the vic-
tims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
By taking an active part in political and social affairs the
people can control world events.
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18. a_. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are
controlled by accidental happenings,
b. There really is no such thing as "luck. 11
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes,
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a_. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you
are.
21. ja. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced
by the good ones,
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance,
lazi ness
,
or a 1 1 th ree
.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b_* I* ' s difficult for people to have much control over the things
politicians do in office.
23. at. Sometimes i can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades
they give.
b. There Is a direct connection between how hard I study and the
grades I get.
2k. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they
should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a^. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things
that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an
important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b_. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if
they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing,
_b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the di-
rection my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the
way they do*
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government
on a national as well as on a local level.
NOTE: Score is number of underlined items.
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APPENDIX D
Generalized Expectancy for Success Scale
This is a questionnaire to find out how people believe they will do
in certain situations. Each item consists of a five-point scale and a
belief statement regarding one's expectations about events. Please in-
dicate the degree to which you believe the statement would apply to you
personally by circling the appropriate number. Give the answer that you
truly bel ieve best appl i es to you and not what you would 1 i ke to be true
or think others would want to hear. Answer the items careful ly , but do
not spend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer to
every item , even if the statement describes a situation you presently do
not expect to encounter. Answer as if you were going to be in each sit-
uation. Also try to respond to each item independently when making
your choice; do not be influenced by your previous choices.
n the future I expect that I wi 1 1 . . .
1.
. .
.find that people don't seem to understand what I am trying to
say.
highly
improbable 3
highly
probable
be discouraged about my ability to gain the respect of othe rs
h i gh ly
imp rob ab le 12 3^
3. . . .be a good parent.
h i gh ly
improbable 12 3^
4. . . .be unable to accomplish my goals.
h i gh ly
improbable 12 3^
5. . . -have a successful marital relationship
highly
improbable 1 2 3
6. . . .deal poorly with emergency situations.
highly
Improbable 1 2 3 ' *»
highly
5 probable
5
hi gh ly
probab le
h i gh ly
probab le
hi gh ly
probab le
high ly
probab le
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7.
.
.
.find my efforts to change situations I don't like are ihef
feet i ve.
3
10
12.
h i gh ly
improbable 1 2
highly
5 probable
.not be very good at learning new skills.
hi gh
1
y
improbable 1 2 3 k
. .
.carry through my responsibilities successfully
hi ghly
5 probable
h i gh ly
improbable 1 2 3 ^
.
.
.discover that the good in life outweighs the bad
hi gh ly
5 probable
hi ghly
improbable 1 2 3 4
11.
. . .handle unexpected problems successfully.
hi gh ly
5 probable
highly
i mprobab le 1 2 3
. . .get the promot i ons I deserve
4
hi gh ly
5 probable
hi gh ly
improbable 1 2 3
13- . • .succeed in the projects I undertake,
hi gh ly
i mprobab le 1 2 3
k
highly
5 probable
highly
5 probable
14. . . .not make any significant contributions to society.
highly
improbable 1
hi gh ly
5 probable
15. . . .discover that my life is not getting much better.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
16. . . .be listened to when I speak.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
r7k
17.
. .
.discover that my plans don't work out well.
•
.
hl9hl
J\ highlyImprobable 12345 probable
18.
. .
.find that no matter how hard I try, things just don't turn
out the way I would like.
.
hI 9hl V highly
Improbable 1 2 3 * 5 prob able
19.
. . .handle myself well in whatever situation Mm in.
.
highly highly
improbable 1 2 3 k 5 probable
20.
. .
.be able to solve my own problems.
highly highly
improbable 123^5 probable
21.
. . .succeed at most things I try.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
22. . . .be successful in my endeavors in the long run.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
23. . . .be very successful working out my personal life.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
2k. . . .experience many failures in my life.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
25. . . .make a good impression on people i meet for the first time
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
26. . . .attain the career goals I have set for myself.
highly highly
improbable 12 3^5 probable
.
.have difficulty dealing with my superiors.
highly highly
mprobable 1 2 3 h 5 probable
. .have problems working with others.
highly highly
mprobable 12 3^5 probable
.
.be a good judge of what it takes to get ahead.
highly highly
mprobable 1 2 3 k 5 probable
. .achieve recognition in my profession.
highly highly
improbable 1 2 3 4 5 probable
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APPENDIX E
Reinforcement Value Scale
How important is it for you to do well on this task?
not 1 2 3 ii 5 very
important important
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APPENDIX F
Post-Experimental Questlonnai re
1. What do you think was the purpose of this experiment?
2. How would you describe the process by which you dealt with the
simultaneous slide and card presentations?
3- How long do you think you worked on this task?
a) Did you change your procedure in any way while doing so? If
so, how? When? Please be as detailed as possible.
*4. Why did you decide to terminate
a) the presentation of the cards; and/or
b) the experiment
when you did?
5. Do you think there was any deception in this experiment?
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APPENDIX G
Standard Feedback Form
Thank you for your participation. As you probably noticed, the
rate of slide presentation kept increasing, making it more and more dif-
ficult to respond to both the slides and the cards. The aim of the
study is to determine the strategies used in dealing with such a situa-
tion and how they relate to an individual's perception of personal vs.
environmental control. We expect that the way en individual tries to
control information will reflect his generalized perception of personal
VS . environmental control. Your GPA and SAT scores were needed as an
experimental control measure.
If you have any questions, I will be glad to answer them. Thank
you once again for your participation.
Name


